I have made the point elsewhere [1] that we should '… not fall into the trap of assuming that a logical proposition is necessarily a sensible one -which is itself an error in logic! Careful consideration of the starting point and the explicit and implicit assumptions being made may reveal that a logical conclusion may be far from sensible. Unfortunately some standards themselves suffer from this same condition; logical but not sensible. I can see how this comes about; you start with a simple premise and build logically, each step, each additional principal and consideration flowing inexorably, indisputably from there. The final structure is entirely self consistent and rigorous, but somewhere along the way it becomes so very much more than simply fit-for-purpose. You start with a brick and end up with a cathedral, when what you really needed was a small extension… there is a need for standards committees to look back to the starting point and consider where logic has carried them and whether the position remains sensible in terms of the ultimate objective of the mission. I do not suggest there is any conspiracy here, but there is a potential for experts to become seduced by their own expertise and to pursue excellence or refinement for its own sake or in competition with one another. There are also those that have a vested interest in elaboration, who look to become the new priesthood with exclusive rights to the performance of rituals.' I find the Energy Institute's 'Guidelines for managing inspection of Ex electrical equipment ignition risk in support of IEC 60079-17' [2] to be a good (bad?!) example of this concern. The document is an impressive piece of work and I have no reason to doubt that it is consistent and logical; I find however that it is far from sensible, and you have to worry about a guidance document that is literally three times longer than the standard it provides guidance to. There is a deal of cleverness here, particularly with regard to the determination of a sample inspection methodology on a rigorous statistical basis, but given the nature of the inspection challenge in practice, the proposed approach is fantastically over elaborate.
The Guidelines purport to identify an ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) basis for inspection methodology on the grounds that ALARP Acceptance Safety Levels (ASLs) are '…derived by identifying cliff edges from graphs of discrimination ratio versus ASL for each lot size across the global failure rate using data from the corresponding sampling tables'. (Section C.8) The sampling tables are themselves compiled using a hypogeometric or binomial law to calculate the probabilities that determine the discrimination ratios. (Section C.3) (And you thought you just needed to see if your enclosures had been clobbered by a scaffold pole!) There is a serious disconnect here between day-to-day operations and maintenance of process plant and the 'guidance' that is being offered. This guidance will not be understood by the professional engineer on the Clapham omnibus. (I warn you now; by the time you get to the end of the appendices you may find yourself laughing hysterically and in danger of being sectioned.)
The notion here is that the bottom of the 'cliff edge' represents a point where increased sampling effort brings markedly reduced return, but this in itself does not necessarily correspond with the ALARP requirement, because there is no measure here of incremental risk reduction versus expenditure. For all we know, grossly disproportionate expenditure might be reached before the cliff edge. The standard explicitly acknowledges that '..the sampling methodology does not account for the consequences of a fire/explosion, nor does it take any credit for any mitigation measures.' (3.5.2) Call me picky if you like, but any health and safety risk assessment that does not take account of consequence looks to me to be of questionable value.
The Guidelines aim to develop an RBI (Risk Based Inspection) approach to focus efforts on equipment where there is a greater risk. Sensible enough in principle of course. As a starting point for defining equipment lots for inspection, the Guidelines propose a simple matrix (Table 3 .1) in which risk is categorised as being high/ medium/low on the basis of zone of use (0/1/2) and 'Probability of source of ignition being present' assessed on the basis of electrical current level (intrinsically safe systems/other instrumentation/power circuits).
The Guidelines propose a factor 2 shift in preliminary inspection frequency depending on risk, so that frequency is doubled for high risk items, halved for low risk. (Table  3. 2) Why a factor 2? We are not told, but it does seem sensible that there should be a degree of proportionality with assessed risk, and a factor 2 does not seem unreasonable. The lack of rigour here does not disturb me; given the uncertainties in hazardous area classification and equipment defect rates, attempts to introduce a high degree of rigour are misplaced.
I have some sympathy with this preliminary matrix as being suitably straightforward, but 'Probability of a source of ignition being present' does not vary simply with electrical current level. In this context, it varies rather with 'susceptibility to degradation to an ignition capable condition'. I can imagine that some instrumentation might be more susceptible to degradation than some power equipment; just think of the proverbial scaffold pole bouncing off an Ex 'd' motor and shattering an Ex 'e' instrument enclosure.
Note also that protection robustness is matched to the zone: Type 'e' in zone 1 is not necessarily riskier than type
Harvey T. Dearden
Time Domain Solutions Ltd.
Contributed Paper: Energy Institute Guidelines to 'Ex' Inspections: A Polemical Critique
'n' in zone 2. The whole point of type 'e' is that it provides more robust protection (allowing use in a zone 1 where there is a higher potential for the presence of a flammable atmosphere). Similarly, type 'ia' offers more robust (fault tolerant) protection than type 'ib'. Inevitably there are allsorts of ifs, buts and maybes here, and the broad uncertainties with these concerns point to the questionable value of a rigorous statistical determination of a sampling regime.
In Annex B of the Guidelines, a more sophisticated basis for identifying equipment lots is proposed based on the following factors:
Hazardous area classification It is inevitable that there will be broad uncertainties associated with these categorisations and values and it becomes questionable whether the additional complication is warranted in the face of these uncertainties.
In assessing the significance of defects identified in a sampled lot, (in order to compare this with the nominated rejection criterion), the Guidelines then propose that weighting factors should be applied depending on the level of ignition risk. (B.3.9.1.1)
All this sits strangely with the rigour of the determination of the rejection criteria for a particular lot size, global failure rate and acceptable safety level. This a bit like saying the level is measured as 6.476354m, give or take a metre! The Guidelines points to sampled detailed inspections in order to check the condition of the enclosure internals. (2.9.2) However, IEC 60079-17 [3] only calls for a sample of 'detailed' inspections in support of a change in the period between close/visual inspections, or where close/visual inspection indicates possible degradation that warrants detailed investigation. There is also recognition in both IEC 60079-17 and the Guidelines that any disturbance to the installation (e.g., removal of covers) risks the introduction of faults. I believe this to be a critical pragmatic consideration -if it ain't broke don't fix it.
Note also that IEC 60079-17 explicitly makes the point (4.3.3) that 'Sample inspection should not be expected to reveal faults of a random nature, such as loose connections, but should be used to monitor the effects of environmental conditions, vibration, inherent design weakness, etc.' Under IEC 60079-17, detailed inspection is required at initial installation. After first commissioning, provided robust management of change controls are in place, detailed inspection (in accordance with IEC 60079-17 schedules) of established equipment has very limited scope in terms of identifying degradation of equipment (as distinct from installation error) that would not be evident from visual/close inspection. In this respect there is little 'value added' from detailed inspection other than at installation/replacement/repair.
The Guidelines do point to a variety of useful considerations in the establishment of an inspection regime, (I do not claim they are without value). But it is difficult to identify these particular trees in the very elaborate wood that has been planted.
In section 1.3 of the Guidelines, it is acknowledged that 'Application of these Guidelines is likely to increase the demands on management (I'll say!) but should result in greater confidence in the continuing integrity of Ex equipment through more targeted application of inspection resources.' It is also acknowledged (Section 3.1) that 'There will inevitably be variations between different organisation's business models that will dictate to a greater or lesser degree how they choose to manage and operate their installations… Therefore, the guidance should be adapted to fit into a particular organisation's structure.' These and similar statements establish a tone of reasonableness, which perhaps make any objection appear churlish, but I find this reasonableness only extends to the tone, not the substantive content. It all looks so rigorous and plausible; you can understand the poor end user being over awed. This is where the 'clause quoters' step in; they cite a given clause that looks indisputable and lead the way up the logical garden path from there. If you accept the premise you are logically obliged to accept the conclusion. Never underestimate the value of a 'sanity check'.
The Guidelines propose an extensive 'three phase implementation plan' (Section 3.4) for development of a risk based inspection regime; great news for consulting engineers (note to self -why not just run with it?), but simply too burdensome in management effort for most duty holders to pursue. In promoting over elaborate protocols for the management of inspections, these Guidelines do industry a serious disservice, particularly if they are perceived to constitute any sort of benchmark as to good practice. Handle with caution!
